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Chapter 6
LEGAL AUTHORITY AND LIMITATIONS
PHILLIP M. LYONS, JR.
KAREN C. KALMBACH
Statutory authority for law enforcement officers to detain againsttheir will persons suffering from mental illness is reviewed in
Chapter 3. Legislation varies little among the states. As noted in
Chapter 3, the core element for emergency involuntary commitment
is dangerousness to oneself or others. Statutes typically also mandate
immediate or near immediate petition to the courts, and require
immediate or near immediate professional psychiatric review. This
chapter reviews the case law associated with civil commitment
statutes, both historically and in terms of current issues.
Historical Roots of Civil Commitment
At the time of the colonization of the Americas, the responsibility
for the care of persons with mental disabilities rested largely on their
families. This was true both of immigrants and indigenous peoples.
The picture was bleak for those individuals who lacked a support net-
work; rarely, a community would provide for their care. Most often,
though, communities simply banished such persons who often formed
roving bands of drifters. Violence by such persons resulted either in
traditional criminal prosecutions or, at least, traditional criminal sanc-
tions, as no treatment was available (Brakel, Parry, and Weiner, 1985;
Deutsch, 1949; Reisner, Slobogin, and Rai, 1999, Ch. 8). 
Meaningful community involvement in the care for persons with
mental illness or mental retardation did not occur until shortly before
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the Revolutionary War. In the 1750s, Pennsylvania enacted a statute to
establish a hospital that would receive sick persons who were poor—
including poor mentally ill people. A couple of decades later in
Virginia the first mental hospital was built. At this same time, statutes
authorizing the confinement of mentally ill people were springing up
throughout the former colonies. These statutes were in existence at the
time the Constitution was written and ratified (Brakel, Parry, and
Weiner, 1985; Deutsch, 1949; Reisner, Slobogin, and Rai, 1999, Chap.
8).
Civil Commitment Rationales and Authority1
In the two centuries following the initial statutory developments
authorizing civil commitment, despite substantial—at times, even in-
tense—judicial scrutiny, the ability of the state to confine or otherwise
restrict the liberty of mentally disabled persons has never been seri-
ously called into question. This is likely so because the goal of civil
commitment, at least early on, was always benevolent. Civil commit-
ment was relied upon as a way of placing poor people into poorhous-
es to ensure their subsistence at a minimum (Katz, 1986). Mentally dis-
ordered persons with substantial financial means were served by a dif-
ferent legal mechanism, guardianship, which was relied upon to secure
food and shelter through appointment of a paid guardian. Slowly over
time, commitment came to be used as a means of confining persons
with mental illness or mental retardation, irrespective of financial
resources. Similarly, guardianship has come to be relied upon either
as an alternative or as an adjunct to commitment, without regard for
individuals’ wealth. 
POLICE AND PARENS PATRIAE POWERS. As suggested by the preceding
discussion, civil commitment and guardianship have been entwined
both conceptually and practically for quite some time. Civil commit-
ments do and always have included some guardianship features.
Guardianship does and always has included some of the deprivations
associated with civil commitment. This same complementary relation-
ship that we see relative to legal mechanisms also exists relative to the
legal power that drives them. 
The deprivation of liberty is typically premised on and accom-
plished through one—or both—of two types of government authority,
namely, the state’s police power or the state’s parens patriae power.
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Legal Authority and Limitations 101
Police power commitments are generally said to be those that are
based on a finding of dangerousness, whereas parens patriae commit-
ments can be based on other criteria such as inability to care for one-
self. Of course, it is often difficult to delineate precisely where one type
of commitment ends and the other begins, just as it is difficult to deter-
mine where guardianship efforts begin and commitment efforts end.
Whether through police or parens patriae powers, and whether through
guardianship or commitment proceedings, ostensibly-benevolent pa-
ternalism is a guiding force—the state is seeking to help its charges who
are believed to be unable to help themselves, in this case, due to men-
tal disorder (theoretically, the same parens patriae rationale undergirds
and drives the juvenile justice system.) 
The state’s police power essentially is the authority of the govern-
ment to act in furtherance of public safety and it is one of the most
important essential governmental functions. The enforcement of law
and punishment of wrongdoers is, perhaps, the most familiar expres-
sion of this power. Likewise, it is the exercise of power about which
there is most consensus; few people would argue that the state lacks
the authority to deprive fairly convicted criminals of their liberty.
However, much less agreement exists about the legitimacy of flexing
the police power against persons who have not been accused, much
less convicted, of crime, but rather, are suspected of having a mental
disorder. This picture has become even murkier in recent years as
Sexually Violent Predator Statutes have come into play resulting in
commitments of convicted criminals who already have served their
time and who lack the kinds of mental disorders that historically were
thought to be necessary to justify commitment. The blurring of these
boundaries is not trivial; because of differences in underlying motives
(e.g., benevolence) and assumptions (e.g., competence, blameworthi-
ness), deprivations of liberty premised on police powers are typically
subject to greater safeguards than those premised on parens patriae
authority.
Efforts at delineating the contours of police power commitments
typically focus on the importance and meaning of “dangerousness” as
a commitment criterion. This is not as straightforward as it might seem
at first blush. As one of us noted elsewhere with others:
Dangerousness is believed wrongly to be a condition, such as tuberculosis, that
someone either does or does not have, and that can be detected (or “predict-
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ed,” if we are speaking of violence) with a certain degree of accuracy. We have
argued that dangerousness is a moral attribution that can be made with vary-
ing degrees of fairness but not accuracy. (Melton, Lyons, and Spaulding, 1998,
104)
The moral dimension of the determination stems, at least in part, from
the contextual variables that are at least separate from, if not altogeth-
er independent of, the individual and his or her mental illness. The
determination of dangerousness must be made relative to a particular
individual within a specific community. The availability of intensive
monitoring within the community, for example, may lead to a deter-
mination that an individual is nondangerous and, therefore, noncom-
mittable, in one community, whereas that same individual would be
considered dangerous and, therefore, committable, in another that
lacks such supervision. Thus, dangerousness is a moral judgment
arrived at not through accuracy, but rather, through varying degrees
of fairness. 
CONTRACT LAW. As noted above, guardianship originally was
intended to facilitate management of fiscal affairs of mentally disor-
dered persons who had wealth. Some type of guardianship, thus,
arguably may be necessary for the dual purposes of protecting the per-
son from exploitation and ensuring that those who do business with
such persons will not run the risk of having those transactions voided
later for lack of contractual capacity. Insofar as the provision of serv-
ices to mentally disordered persons involves contracts—implied or oth-
erwise—it is useful to construe parens patriae power as inclusive of the
authority to authorize the treatment of those who cannot consent to
such treatment themselves. To the extent that the provision of mental
health and mental retardation services involves a contract, it is not sur-
prising that parens patriae power also should be relied upon to author-
ize treatment of a person who cannot give informed consent to (i.e.,
freely contract for) that treatment. It is worth noting that, although a
commitment or guardianship occurs, such an event does not extin-
guish all of the rights possessed by the subject of the proceedings, even
as relates to autonomy and decision making. Even committed persons,
for example, retain rights to consent to—and, by definition, refuse to
consent to—treatment. Of course, as with the other liberties involved,
treatment can be coerced through state intervention. Absent such
intervention, however, informed consent to treatment remains a
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Legal Authority and Limitations 103
requirement. Interest in guardianship as a means of facilitating mental
health treatment for people who have been committed is increasing as
concern intensifies about the liability that may attach to treatment
without informed consent. Some courts have held that even combin-
ing commitment with guardianship is insufficient to force some treat-
ments without specific approval of the courts (e.g., Rogers v. Okin,
1979). 
Substantive Due Process Considerations
Neither parens patriae nor police powers are without limits. Indeed,
many of the limitations imposed on commitment proceedings
emanate from no less a powerful source of law than the Constitution
itself. The practical consequence of these limitations is the clarification
of commitment criteria. In order to comply with constitutional dictates
relative to substantive due process (i.e., fundamental fairness in deci-
sion making), the criteria must be reasonably related to the powers
being exercised (i.e., police and/or parens patriae). Additionally, the cri-
teria have to be narrowly drawn so as to limit the discretion of the
decision maker. These protections serve not only to provide the
prospective committee with adequate notice as to the applicable stan-
dard but also to give appellate courts a standard against which to judge
the fairness of decisions reached by lower courts. 
Even if the criteria for commitment are articulated with sufficient
precision that they adequately restrict discretion, they nevertheless
may collide with another substantive due process principle, namely,
overbreadth. If the criteria at issue facilitate the commitment of per-
sons who are not legitimately subject to this exercise of government
powers (i.e., people who should not be committed), then the criteria
are unacceptable on ground that they are overbroad. In making this
determination, courts have looked not only at the vagueness or speci-
ficity of criteria, but also at the scope of both police and parens patriae
powers. Determining whether criteria are overbroad, courts have had
to look both at questions of vagueness, and at the scope of the police
and paternalistic powers. These inquiries are related; the broader the
powers, the greater the substantive coverage involved and vice versa. 
THE DANGEROUSNESS CRITERION. The first issue is dangerous persons
can be treated differently. The dangerousness criterion was described
above as being the chief catalyst for contemporary discussions about
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civil commitment. This is so because of its heavy influence on the
exercise of police power in a variety of contexts. The United States
Supreme Court has reviewed five such contexts, namely: (a) civil com-
mitment of those not involved in criminal activity, (b) civil commit-
ment of those found not guilty by reason of insanity in criminal court,
(c) preventive detention of minors who have been accused of having
violated criminal law, (d) the preventive detention of adults who have
been accused of having violated criminal law, and (e) the imposition
of the death penalty. In the first four of these contexts, a finding of dan-
gerousness can lead to confinement based, at least in part, on preven-
tive detention goals. In death sentencing, dangerousness is construed
as an aggravating factor that allows for the imposition of the death
penalty under some state statutory schemes (e.g., Tex Code of Crim
Pro. art. 37.07, (2(b)(1) (West 1981)).
In light of the previous discussion about the benevolent goals of civil
commitment, it may seem odd to characterize civil commitment as a
form of preventive detention. Indeed, one of the rationales for com-
mitment and guardianship proceedings is that they facilitate the acqui-
sition of treatment services by those who are presumed to be inca-
pable of accessing those services on their own. Such a position,
though,
depends . . . on limiting involuntary commitment to those patients who are
treatable in the setting to which they are being sent, actually providing the indi-
cated treatment, and detaining them only long enough to accomplish the need-
ed intervention. If any of these conditions are absent, the mental health system
is in fact being used for preventive detention purpose. (Appelbaum 1988, 780)
Clearly, civil commitment occurs regardless of the committee’s
treatment amenability; many people are committed whose conditions
cannot be treated. Thus, at least some of the motivation behind com-
mitment is the promotion of public safety through the incapacitation
of dangerous people.
O’Connor v. Donaldson (1975) was the first case wherein the United
States Supreme Court addressed the dangerousness criterion as it
related to civil commitment. A few key points are worth considering
before seeking to generalize O’Connor. 
First, this ruling left unanswered more questions about civil com-
mitment laws in existence at that time than it answered. Second, the
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Legal Authority and Limitations 105
decision led to substantial reform in civil commitment statutes, so
much so that contemporary commitment statutes and procedures bear
relatively little resemblance to those considered by the Court. As a
consequence of that decision, and widespread legislative reform of the
1970s, most contemporary commitment laws are so different from the
law by which Kenneth Donaldson was committed that the decision in
his case tells us very little about what changes in contemporary com-
mitment laws might be permissible. Finally, later decisions by the
Court have made it clear that unfairness in commitment proceedings
can obtain even with a dangerousness criterion. Before turning to the
holding, a brief recitation of the relevant facts is in order.
Kenneth Donaldson was involuntarily committed to the Florida
State Hospital. He remained there for 15 years against his will and,
from time-to-time, demanded his release from the institution, claiming
he was not mentally ill. He even had opportunities to be released to
be cared for by a college classmate and a halfway house. In declaring
Donaldson’s confinement unconstitutional, the Court held: “A State
cannot constitutionally confine without more a non dangerous indi-
vidual who is capable of surviving safely in freedom by himself or with
the help of willing and responsible family members or friends” (1975,
576). The language, thus, suggests that a dangerous person would be
committable under the circumstances even though a nondangerous
person would not be. Given the apparent importance of dangerous-
ness, it is important to know the scope of the construct.
The second issue is dangerousness can be defined broadly. O’Connor was
followed by two cases that suggest that the definition of dangerous is
wide open. Jones v. U. S. (1983) presented the Supreme Court with the
question of the constitutionality of the commitment of a man acquitted
of the crime of attempted shoplifting (of a jacket) by reason of insani-
ty. By the time the case reached the Court, Jones had been in custody
for a decade. Jones argued, among other things, that the crime at issue
did not involve substantive dangerousness and, therefore, the com-
mitment was improper. The Court rejected that argument and held
that the states were free to define dangerousness as encompassing at
least what is contained in the criminal code. The Jones decision large-
ly left procedural questions unanswered and turned aside the plain-
tiff’s argument that the ten-year period of confinement was impermis-
sible because it was substantially longer than he would have received
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if he had been convicted of a crime.
In Schall v. Martin (1984), the Court addressed some of these issues
more squarely in the context of the civil commitment of a minor.
Justice Rehnquist, writing for a majority of the Court approved the
practice that effectively constituted the preventive detention of juve-
niles detained on delinquency charges. The statute at issue was similar
to those in effect at the time in all 50 states and the District of
Columbia. When presented with the question of whether the commit-
ment was “fundamentally fair,” the Court said the answer hinges on a
two-pronged inquiry. First, the loss of liberty associated with the com-
mitment must be justified by the social benefit that results from the
commitment. Second, unless the detention occurs in the context of a
criminal conviction, that is, not a civil commitment, then the confine-
ment cannot amount to punishment. In that particular case, the Court
held that the social interests outweighed the plaintiff’s liberty interests,
in part, because his minority status entitled him to a diminished liber-
ty interest in the first place as compared with that possessed by adults. 
As noted above, many of the issues in Schall seemed to relate to the
plaintiff’s status as a juvenile. In United States v. Salerno (1987) the Court
extended some of the reasoning in Schall to adults. In that case, it held
that dangerousness could be used to justify the denial of bail to adult
criminal defendants. The third issue is dangerousness and other criteria.
As the foregoing analysis makes clear, applying the dangerousness cri-
terion is fraught with conceptual and practical difficulties. As compli-
cated as that is, though, it becomes more complicated when the crite-
rion must be applied in the context of other criteria. “Dangerousness
to self” is considered by some to be a particular instance of the dan-
gerousness criterion. Still others, though, consider it to be a separate
criterion. Sometimes formulated as “passive dangerousness,” danger-
ousness to self or inability to care for oneself is often used as a com-
mitment criterion. Of course, as with all commitment contexts, the
dangerousness to self or inability to care for oneself must be the result
of a mental disorder. Some jurisdictions take a more proactive stance
and authorize commitment where there has been a significant deteri-
oration in functioning even if it has not yet risen to the level of ren-
dering one passively dangerous. The reasoning for these statutes is
heavily weighted in the direction of parens patriae rationales; the
statutes seek to intervene with help before the deleterious effects of the
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Legal Authority and Limitations 107
disorder become too pronounced.
Although the foregoing standards are important and must be satis-
fied for civil commitment, they are not the only criteria that must be
met. Regardless of the reason that commitment is sought—whether it
be dangerousness, inability to care for oneself, or serious deteriora-
tion—most civil commitment statutes require additional criteria also be
met simultaneously (conjunctively). Specifically, as noted above, there
must be evidence of a mental disorder or disability. In some jurisdic-
tions there must also be evidence of treatment need, treatment amena-
bility, and/or an inability or unwillingness to give informed consent to
proposed treatment options. 
In addition to the critical conjunctive and disjunctive criteria out-
lined, there are also somewhat less substantive requirements that must
also be considered either in conjunction with, or as an alternative to,
the dangerousness standard. These criteria are considered to be less
substantive as they tend to focus more on how someone is to be com-
mitted, rather than who can be committed. 
The “least restrictive alternative” is another common commitment
criterion that is also less substantive and more of a procedural safe-
guard. It calls for the court to be apprised of all available less restric-
tive alternatives to institutional confinement before authorizing com-
mitment of an individual. It does not, however, define or restrict who
may be committed. 
Right to Treatment
In O’Connor, the opinion appears to evade deliberately the more dif-
ficult issue of Donaldson’s right to treatment. Quite possibly the
Court’s rationale may have been that as O’Connor did not have the
right to treat Donaldson, he could not have had a duty to treat him,
thus making treatment a moot point. Similarly, the Court did not
address whether the commitment of a nondangerous person might be
justified by the provision of treatment as Donaldson did not receive
treatment. 
The use of the phrase “without more” (1975, 576) in the Court’s
opinion, and the fact that Donaldson received no treatment from the
hospital (in part due to respect for his religious convictions), left open
the possibility that the provision of needed services might justify the
commitment of nondangerous persons for purposes of treatment
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alone. However, the opinion in total, complete with Chief Justice
Burger’s concurring opinion is clear in its rejection of the Fifth
Circuit’s position that the provision of necessary treatment justifies the
commitment of nondangerous persons. 
The Supreme Court took a firm stance on the unacceptability of
committing individuals who are simply “physically unattractive or
socially eccentric” (575). Mental illness or disability does not, per se,
“disqualify a person from preferring his home to the comforts of an
institution” (575). Nonetheless, there are a number of circumstances
under which nondangerous persons have mental disorders whose
symptoms amount to more than mere “eccentricity,” and for whom
hospitalization may be the only means of survival. Such circumstances
were not addressed in O’Connor.
In drafting O’Connor, the Court allowed state legislatures the latitude
to create commitment statutes which, while avoiding vagueness and
overbroad inclusion criteria, focused on treatment need, emphasizing
the provision of services, at the same time downplaying or ignoring
dangerousness criteria. 
The Least Restrictive Alternative Criterion
As revealed by case law tracking commitment legislation, the prob-
lem of vagueness in definitional criteria is challenging. In particular,
how do courts delineate the point at which self-neglect becomes an
inability to care for self or dangerousness to self and/or others?
Considering two criteria in tandem—inability to care for self and least
restrictive alternatives—helps to clarify the issue and assist in decision-
making. The least restrictive alternative requires that no other reme-
diation short of commitment be available to negate the ill effects of
possible self-harm. In other words, in the case of an individual who is
no longer able to care for him or herself, it must be shown that there
are no other available alternatives to care which impose less restriction
upon freedom and autonomy as would commitment. 
Although this approach helps to define, clarify, and restrict parens
patriae criteria necessary for commitment, it does not specify or help
quantify the amount or nature of the harm sufficient to justify com-
mitment. The typical formulation of the least restrictive alternative cri-
terion leaves unanswered the questions surrounding what other forms
of treatment must be considered and how degrees of restrictiveness
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Legal Authority and Limitations 109
should be measured or conceptualized. 
The modern day least restrictive criterion is anchored in First
Amendment jurisprudence. In O’Connor Justice Potter Stewart cited
the decision in Shelton v. Tucker (1960) reversing a requirement that
public employees report all organizational memberships because
there existed less drastic alternatives to this option. Relying on this rea-
soning, Justice Stewart notes: “while the State may arguably confine a
person to save him from harm, incarceration is rarely if ever a neces-
sary condition for raising the living standards of those capable of sur-
viving safely in freedom, on their own or with the help of family or
friends” (1975, 575). Implicit in the O’Connor ruling is a fundamental
premise that the state may restrict an individual’s liberty only when
there are no lesser restrictive options available to prevent harm of self
and/or others. 
This newly-crafted least restrictive principle was soon widely adopt-
ed by states and incorporated into revised commitment codes. Some
statutes simply required that a person be judged not “capable of sur-
viving safely in freedom, on [his] own, or with the help of family or
friends” (1975, 575; see also, Thomas S. v. Flaherty, 1988). Although we
have attempted to make a distinction between procedural and sub-
stantive elements of the commitment process, it is sometimes not very
useful to separate these goals or criteria. As can be seen, the least
restrictive alternative standard is an example of one such element. 
Conclusion
Police authority to intervene by emergency involuntary commit-
ment of a person suffering from severe mental illness is premised upon
dual consideration of police and parens patriae powers of the state. Such
intervention is first closely circumscribed by statute, and further limit-
ed by case law. The dangerousness criterion is paramount in all dis-
cussion of legal authority and limitations. Despite the specificity of
statutes, and despite carefully drawn case law, a judgment of danger-
ousness is still a subjective one, dependent as much upon the “com-
mon sense” of individual police officers as anything.
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1. The following sections are based largely on Melton, Lyons, & Spaulding, 1998,
Chapters 3 & 4.
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